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Abstract
Derivatives are contingent claims that complete ¯nancial markets.
Their use allow agents and ¯rms to ameliorate the impact over con-
sumption, production and investment given a change in relative prices
induced by an active monetary policy. In this sense, derivatives gene-
rate in some cases a loss in the e®ectiveness of the traditional monetary
transmission channels in the short run, and in others, they promote an
increase in the speed of transmission itself. Using an investment model,
the impact of the use of interest rate and exchange rate derivatives in
the dilution of colombian monetary channels is veri¯ed. Empirical e-
xercises suggest that monetary policy has lost e®ectiveness in the short
run. In spite of the surprise this result may o®er given the relative im-
matureness of domestic derivative markets, the marginal e®ect of these
instruments appears to be signi¯cant, in the face of local ¯nancial mar-
kets' imperfections. In addition, not only the hedge directly taken by
¯rms with access to this instruments matter; there could be hedging
spill-overs whenever commercial banks use derivatives, which allow for
a more stable and cheap credit supply for ¯rms with no access to those
markets. The natural recommendation deriving from this conclusion
suggests an urgent analysis of the derivatives impact over the speed of
monetary transmission in Colombia.
JEL Classi¯cation: E22; E52; G11.
Key Words: Derivatives; Monetary Policy Transmission Channels; In-
vestment.
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11 Introduction
The deepening of derivative markets has generated doubts as to whether
these may have an impact over prices in goods and capital markets. In
particular, derivatives o®er hedging possibilities against adverse economic
shocks and policy decisions, diluting the traditional monetary policy trans-
mission channels and/or making such transmission faster . In other words,
these hedging instruments a®ect the ways through which changes in mo-
netary policy variables alter production and consumption decisions by ¯rms
and agents in the economy.
The aforementioned is founded on the constant development of derivative
instruments, which has allowed a ful¯lment of ¯nancial vacuums, unifying
traditionally fractioned markets, facilitating a faster transmission of mo-
netary policy changes, with real e®ects that may be smaller over time. In
a nutshell, ¯nancial derivatives may weaken monetary policy channels in
certain cases, and in general, allow a faster transmission.
Recent literature counts few papers that study the diluting e®ect of
derivatives over monetary policy transmission channels. Among the most
important stand Fender (2000b) for the US and Vrolijk (1997) for the UK.
The present paper analyzes the diluting phenomenon of monetary po-
licy transmission channels due to the availability of derivative markets in
Colombia, but leaves aside the question about the e®ect of the latter over
transmission speed. The proposed methodology improves at least in four
aspects previous contributions: 1) Firm-level Microdata is used 1, which
is novel in the literature, where only aggregate analyzes are found. 2) A
model for an optimizing ¯rm is presented. 3) An estimation technique for
unbalanced panel data models is used, developed by Bi¿rn (1999a) for the
case of one-way random e®ects over the intercept 2. 4) A di®erent policy
proxy is proposed, instead of the interest rate. In particular, the Monetary
Conditions Index (MCI) built at Banco de la Republica is introduced, which
evaluates the position of monetary policy with respect to aggregate demand,
weighting the impacts of both the interest and exchange rates.
In the second part of the paper a revision of the literature concerning
the impact of derivatives over monetary transmission channels is presented.
In the third part the main characteristics and functions of derivatives are
highlighted. In the fourth, the theory of the e®ect of derivatives' use over
transmission and monetary strategies is outlined. The ¯fth part presents the
1The database is built upon data from Superintendencia de Valores and Superinten-
dencia de Sociedades (Both of which constitute the Colombian Securities Exchange Com-
mission). Both databases present anual ¯gures (end of year) and have info for more than
15,000 ¯rms, from 1995 to 2003.
2The case of Swamy-type random coe±cients (di®erent intercept and slope for each
¯rm) considered by Bi¿rn (1999b), could not be easily applicable to the present case, taking
into account that the historical series have no more than 9 observations in comparison to
the total number of ¯rms. This generates computational problems, even in the balanced
case.
2stylized facts of the colombian derivative markets and in the sixth, the model
for investment is described, along with its estimation, data used and results.
In the last part, conclusions and policy recommendations are derived.
2 Literature on the Impact of Derivatives over
Monetary Policy Transmission Channels
For more than a decade now, a number of papers have been written around
the idea that imperfections in ¯nancial markets generated by information
assymetries, may cause or reinforce real business cycles 3. In such context,
a tight monetary policy can induce an extra cost in addition to the typical
cost of capital mentioned in the Keynesian literature, which in turn may
lead to a credit crunch.
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) show that a monetary shock diminishes
bank reserves and hence, the credit that they may extend to ¯rms. This
phenomenon is known as the credit channel of monetary policy 4.
Fender (2000a), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) ¯nd that a tight monetary policy a®ects corporate cash
°ows, lessening the ability of the ¯rm to ¯nd credit. This latter e®ect is
known in the literature as the balance sheet e®ect, wealth e®ect or ¯nancial
accelerator.
More recently, Froot et Al. (1993) and Fender (2000a), show that if in-
formation asymmetries increase the cost of external ¯nance vis a vis internal
¯nancing, incentives are created for ¯rms to manage corporate risk. Busi-
nesses that depend upon internal funds need their cash °ows to °uctuate the
least possible and hence, are interested in using mechanisms that guarantee
such stability. Derivatives allow ¯rms to face such ¯nancial risk 5, in a way
that grants them a shield against changes in the monetary stance, thereby
weakening the real e®ect of monetary policy.
A ¯rm that has access to instruments such as forwards and swaps, is
therefore able to hedge against interest or exchange rate risk, loosing sen-
sitivity in the face of changes in monetary conditions, re°ecting on real
economic activity through its investment decisions. However, several theo-
retical papers show that in certain circumstances, derivatives could reinforce
volatility in ¯nancial markets 6, which has shifted the focus of the actual
debate to empirical grounds.
Papers that verify the aforementioned hypothesis are scarce, being the
3See, for example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996).
4For the credit channel to exist, a reduction in reserves caused by a tight monetary
policy must reduce the volume of credit by banks. In addition, it requieres that ¯rms be
unable to ¯nd other sources of ¯nancing without having to incur in greater costs, which
induces a lower investment (see, among others, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996, Romer and
Romer, 1990 y Bernanke and Blinder, 1992).
5See Von Hagen and Fender (1998) for a detailed explanation.
6See Morales (2001) and Van Der Nat (2000).
3most important Fender (2000b) for the US and Vrolijk (1997) for the UK. In
the former, derivatives are modelled in an implicit manner, using data from
the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations (QFR),
with ¯rm aggregations depending on the level of assets. In the latter,
derivatives are modelled explicitly and their impact over aggregate variables
is veri¯ed. Both papers use a Vector Autoregressive Methodology (VAR),
although their results di®er. While Fender (2000b) ¯nds evidence that the
presence of derivative markets has had a structural impact over ¯rms choices
in the US, Vrolijk (1997) ¯nds the opposite for the UK and argues that this
result may be derived from the fact that the UK ¯nancial market may have
been su±ciently developed prior to the introduction of derivatives, in such
a way that their marginal e®ect may have been negligible.
3 Characteristics and Functionality of Derivatives
As mentioned before, derivatives allow for an arti¯cial stripping of the risks
embedded in a ¯nancial asset. As a byproduct, derivatives complete ¯nancial
markets by allocating risks among investors in an optimal way, given their
preferences. The bene¯ts for markets can be grouped in three 7: 1) Hedging
possibilities, 2) Leveraging, given the increase in the volume of transactions
while at the same time the cost of capital diminishes, and 3) Substitutability
between assets.
On the other hand, derivatives may generate instability, in the sense that:
1) They amplify price movements whenever hedging is dynamic, 2) They
may generate systemic risk if margin calls are not carried by a su±ciently
collateralized provider, and 3) They may induce adverse capital °ows, in the
face of erratic policies.
In a nutshell, derivatives may create discipline in economic policy, despite
the ambiguity of their ¯nal e®ect. In what follows, the main economic
functions of derivatives are presented.
3.1 Economic Functions of Derivatives
Fender and Von Hagen (1998) pinpoint several economic functions of deriva-
tives. First, derivatives reduce transaction costs, which in turn allow for a
better exploitation of investors' comparative advantage. For example, two
investors may exchange interest payments, by which they can use the others'
more e±cient cost structure.
Second, derivatives allow a cheaper diversi¯cation and hedging. Due to
this, portfolios may be less sensitive to interest or exchange rate shocks,
making returns more stable.
7This section closely follows Vrolijk (1997) and Fender and Von Hagen (1998), and is
included for expositional purposes.
4Third, by stripping ¯nancial assets' risks, greater liquidity is achieved.
For example, credit derivatives allow banks to further exploit credit markets,
ameliorating the rationing events resulting from information asymmetries.
Fourth, derivatives create bridges between segmented markets, enhan-
cing substitutability among assets and thus, allow further arbitrage oppor-
tunities.
Summarizing, derivatives complete ¯nancial markets and permit a better
allocation of risks. This has induced a wave of ¯nancial disintermediation,
thereby increasing competition and decreasing margins.
Hence, derivatives could potentially generate both stability and insta-
bility in markets, as Fender and Von Hagen (1998) show. By stripping the
risks embedded in a ¯nancial instrument, di®erent markets are created for
each so that new information about a particular risk not only changes its
own price, but impacts other prices, although to a lesser extent. Derivatives
may also generate instability by allowing traders to take highly leveraged
positions, provided they can trade risks related to a particular asset without
having to e®ectively buy it.
However, greater liquidity and substitutability permit a better and smoo-
ther shock absorbtion, which implies greater stability. In addition, deriva-
tives facilitate the °ow of info to spot prices, through enhanced arbitrage
opportunities between the latter and forward prices, diluting the impact of
new information in the market.
Although there is no international evidence linking the appearance of
derivatives with greater market volatility 8, this question remains unresolved
for the case of Colombia.
4 Implications for Monetary Policy of the Exis-
tence of Derivative Markets
The e®ect of derivatives over monetary policy can be described in two
spheres9: 1) Implications for policy strategies and 2) E®ect over monetary
transmission channels.
In any case, it is important to take into account that derivatives a®ect
policy transmission in various ways (Vrolijk, 1997): 1) Derivatives are inhe-
rently linked to their underlying markets, 2) Derivatives create new ¯nancial
assets, thereby increasing the available information about prices, and 3)
Derivatives may substantially alter the international transmission of shocks,
by making arbitrage easier and cheaper. In what follows, the implications
for monetary transmission and strategies are outlined.
8Fender and Von Hagen (1998) cite the IMF (1997), Cohen (1996) and Board et Al.
(1995).
9This section closely follows Vrolijk (1997), and is included for expositional purposes.
54.1 Implications for Monetary Strategies
Monetary policy consists of a set of rules to manipulate an instrument (e.g.,
the quantity of money or the price of an asset such as the interest rate), with
the precise goal of altering long-run target variables. In order to achieve this,
a medium-run target is established as well, given the di±culty to observe
long-run variables.
This said, a ¯rst impact of the availability of derivatives for monetary
policy is the greater number of prices that may be used as instruments.
Moreover, derivatives o®er embedded info that may be used to improve
monetary strategies. Such is the case of expected volatility implicit in Black
and Scholes (1973)-type options. In addition to this, market expectations
concerning prices of underlying assets may be extracted from call and put
options' volumes. In this way, monetary policy gets a richer view of market
expectations (Vrolijk, 1997).
A second impact of derivatives over policy strategies is given in the con-
text of the discussion as to which instrument works best. In rapidly develo-
ping derivative markets, the majority of shocks can be expected to arise from
the ¯nancial system. In such circumstances, Poole (1970) suggests the use
of a price as instrument, rather than a monetary aggregate 10. However, and
taking into account that monetary policy works in the low end of the yield
curve, derivatives allow for a faster translation of shocks from the low to the
high end of this curve (Vrolijk, 1997 and Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994) such
that changes in the economy, independent of their real or nominal nature,
turn more rapidly onto price changes. Hence, the development and evolu-
tion of derivative instruments which helps markets to discern between real
and monetary shocks, will make a monetary aggregate a better instrument
in the future (Poole, 1970).
On the other hand, policy associated with the exchange rate is even
more a®ected in the face of derivative markets development. In particular,
sterilized interventions to maintain a ¯xed exchange rate are e®ective only
if domestic and foreign markets are imperfect substitutes. However, a more
profound and sophisticated ¯nancial system hinders such sterilization, ma-
king the coexistence of a ¯xed exchange rate regime and an active monetary
policy impossible, in the context of perfect capital °ows.
Finally, Central Banks may use derivatives to conduct monetary policy.
For example, the use of exchange rate options may help the CB to reduce
volatility in times of turbulence (e.g., Mexico and Colombia), or simply
to send policy signals through the implicit depreciation embedded in such
instruments.
10Moreover, money demand turns virtually impossible to estimate in the presence of
multiple ¯nancial instruments. On the other hand, the greater substitutability of as-
sets and the enhanced liquidity provided by derivatives make the de¯nition of monetary
aggregates increasingly di®use (Savona and Macario, 1997), especially broader ones.
64.2 Implications for Monetary Transmission Mechanisms
Following Mies et Al. (2003)11, "the abundant literature about the topic
recognizes, at least, ¯ve monetary policy transmission channels": 1) Interest
rate channel, 2) Asset channel, 3) Exchange rate channel, 4) Credit Channel
and 5) Expectations channel.
In what follows a description is provided about the theoretical e®ect of
derivatives over the interest rate, credit and exchange rate channels only,
for they are the most common in the literature.
4.2.1 Interest Rate Channel E®ect
As Mies et Al. (2003) show, the interest rate channel is the most conven-
tional, and is often used as a general framework to represent the overall
e®ect of all remaining channels.
Vrolijk (1997) asserts that an increase in the interest rate leads agents to
substitute savings for credit in order to smooth their consumption intertem-
porally. The e®ect of such rise in terms of future investment decisions is
negative (capital cost increases) and proves di±cult to hedge. However, a
possibility could arise in order to hedge the adverse impact of the substitu-
tion e®ect (i.e., an agent could engage in a contract in which she locks-in
future interest rates for funding needs). Nevertheless, this is presented as
a mere theoretical possibility, for in practice, there exist several unknown
variables concerning future credit needs, as Vrolijk (1997) pinpoints. Given
these uncertainties and the costs of hedging these risks, derivatives have only
a marginal impact in reducing substitution e®ects arising from interest rate
increases. Thus, the majority of agents will face a higher cost of capital,
with or without derivatives.
On the other hand, the income e®ect is given by the change in income
or cash °ows associated to changes in interest rates. The prevailing e®ect
depends on the pro¯le of net asset holdings by the agent. Vrolijk (1997)
shows that the main potential impact of derivatives over the interest rate
channel rests in the possibility to hedge the income e®ect given changes in
interest rates. Provided their degree of risk aversion, those who buy these
type of instruments have a higher marginal disposition to consume vis a vis
unhedged ones, so that the impact over real variables of a change in interest
rates, in the presence of derivative markets, is substantially lower. However,
the aforementioned fact about the faster transmission of shocks induced by
derivatives' use, implies that the e®ect over unhedged agents will show up
earlier. In this way, the real e®ect of hedging availability in the face of
interest rate movements is ambiguous, given the countervailing forces that
operate.
11These authors provide a detailed description about monetary transmission channels,
di®erentiating the way in which they work domestically and abroad, their composition,
instruments and how each manifests.
7Finally, the wealth e®ects are born in the discounted °ow of future in-
come in two ways, i.e., through the discount rate or the °ows themselves.
Although interest rate hedging is common, illiquid assets such as real
estate are rarely covered (Vrolijk, 1997). In a recent book, Shiller (2003)
suggests that the hedge against those shocks must come from coordinated
international °ows. In this sense, the wealth e®ect is not easily hedged
through the use of derivatives either.
4.2.2 Credit Channel E®ect
The credit channel is composed of two subchannels, i.e., the bank credit
and balance sheet e®ects12, and is born from information asymmetries and
transaction costs.
With respect to the pure credit channel, Vrolijk (1997) shows that the
e®ect of monetary policy over bank credit is reinforced whenever ¯rms count
on intermediaries as the only ¯nancing source. Hence, a tight monetary
policy reduces both bank reserves and credit.
In such a context, big ¯rms with access to capital markets enjoy the
possibility to compensate the credit contraction. However, for smaller ¯rms
that do not have such access, derivatives prove important in order to make
them less sensitive to the impact monetary policy has on credit.
On the other hand, the balance sheet e®ect operates over the ¯rm's
collateral, which decreases due to an increase in interest rates. As a conse-
quence of this, the ¯rm becomes less credit-worthy 13. Vrolijk (1997) shows
that, contrary to what Bernanke and Gertler (1995) say, ¯nancial innovation,
especially in the form of derivatives, allows ¯rms to lock-in future interest
rates and in this way, maintain the value of their collateral despite facing
a higher cost of capital. Due to this, the transmission through the credit
channel is weakened.
4.2.3 Exchange Rate Channel E®ect
As a particular case of the asset channel, and in line with Mies et Al. (2003),
the exchange rate channel allows the transmission of monetary policy over
net exports and interest rate parity.
Following Vrolijk (1997), the e®ect over net exports of exchange rate
changes due to monetary policy maneuvers, may be hedged both by ex-
porters and importers through the use of derivatives. However, whenever
the shock comes from the real exchange rate, hedging becomes less com-
12Vrolijk highlights Bernanke and Gertler (1995) who point out the di±culty in empi-
rically distinguishing among the two.
13The descriptions about the operation of this channel given by Mies et Al. (2003) and
Vrolijk (1997) coincide in highlighting the importance of ¯nancial innovations in a®ecting
the power of monetary policy.
8mon14. Thus, monetary policy may have short-term real e®ects through
changes in the real exchange rate.
The interest rate parity transmits, in words of Vrolijk (1997), "domestic
policy abroad and foreign policy home". The e®ect of derivatives accele-
rates the transmission, increases arbitrage and enhances capital °ows. In a
nutshell, the transmission becomes faster and real impact shows earlier.
5 Stylized Facts of Colombian Derivative Markets
Despite not having a high degree of development, colombian derivative mar-
kets have shown an interesting dynamic in the last 5 years15. In fact, de-
pending on the type of instrument (i.e., interest or exchange rate), there
exist signi¯cant di®erences in terms of development within the derivative
markets themselves.
The market which displays less depth is the local interest rate market,
where only few instruments are available. For example, there are no forward-
rate agreements, nor a great deal of future transactions using bonds. On the
other hand, the market does report "simultaneous" operations, or buy-sell
backs which consist on selling a bond in the spot market and subsequently
purchasing it forward, which ¯nancially, is equivalent to a repurchase agree-
ment (repo). The market for this instrument has been developing hand in
hand with the TES market in latter years, speci¯cally because TES have
been the main underlying assets. Taking the monthly average negotiation
reported through Electronic Negotiation System of the Banco de la Repu-
blica, this has gone from $3:3 trillion pesos in 2002 to $6:5 trillion pesos
in 2004. Although these type of operations o®er agents the possibility of
maintaining future positions in bonds, they may also be caused by liquidity
demand and not to generate a certain exposure in the bonds market.
There exist various reasons for the lack of development in this market,
which can be summarized in the absence of a healthy environment in which
the enhancement of this type of instruments be viable and secure. The
lack of reference indexes in the spot market, the absence of liquidity and
maturity of the market itself as well as problems in monitoring ¯nancial
system agents are some of the impediments to the proper development of
these type of instruments. Currently, there are various projects in progress
which seek to adjust the regulation problems present at the time in addition
to generating liquid references in the short-run spot market that would serve
as underlying indexes.
The exchange rate derivative market has, on the other hand, shown a
much more favorable evolution than that of local interest rate. The exchange
rate forward is probably the most liquid of these type of instruments and
14Unless a strategy using a combination of nominal exchange rate hedging instruments
and indexed bonds is feasible.
15We thank Ana Fernanda Maiguashca for the elaboration of this section.
9Figure 1:
A word of caution regarding the levels of both interest and exchange rate derivatives presented in Figure 1. Since
these ¯gures are obtained from the balance sheet of the ¯nancial system, and considering that most transactions
are between ¯nancial institutions, there may be a problem with the level of notional amounts presented (i.e.
double accounting). Nonetheless, the main interest of this study regards the evolution of derivative markets, and
not the level itself, and thus, correcting this problem, which may prove extremely troublesome, may be irrelevant
for the purpose of this paper.
has grown signi¯cantly in the last years, particularly in the second half of
the 90's, when local currency su®ered speculative attacks which led authori-
ties to replace the exchange rate band with a °oating exchange rate regime.
The monthly average amount negotiated in this market went from around
US$450 million in 1997 to US$2;770 million in 2003. Furthermore, average
duration has increased, in that same time period, from 39 to 71 days. There
does exist a market for swaps and options 16, but it is not particularly liquid
and most instruments are designed for speci¯c necessities of special inter-




There are two main motivations that lead to the election of the particular
econometric model and estimation technique chosen in this paper. First,
international literature does not yet have a ¯rm-level analysis of the impact
derivative markets have on transmission mechanisms. Thus, using panel
data to specify the model represents not only a ¯rst approximation to the
16Particularly since Banco de la Republica had been using them for market intervention.
10problem under a new perspective, but also allows the inclusion of a decision
variable (investment), at an individual level.
Second, given the database used constitutes an unbalanced panel, the
model allows for all the information available to be e±ciently used without
having to arbitrarily eliminate observations in order to balance the sample.
By trying to obtain a balanced panel with the information available, one
would incur in selection bias due to the fact that the resulting database
would probably be comprised of ¯rms that, either have unlimited access to
international and domestic credit markets or else have su±ciently large asset
levels as to smoothen the impact of a tight monetary policy. This selection
bias would therefore complicate capturing the existing di®erences between
¯rms, which are at the heart of the ¯nancial accelerator.
Having the former in mind, the model is estimated using the methodology
developed by Bi¿rn (1999a), from which one obtains the Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) parameter estimator for a model of simultaneous equations
seemingly unrelated with the error term, using a speci¯cation of individual
random e®ects over the intercept, under a structure of unbalanced panel
data (see Appendix B).
The random e®ects speci¯cation allows capturing heterogeneity between
¯rms in the sample, which arise fundamentally from idiosyncratic factors,
such as di®erences in organizational structure, varying access to credit and
capital markets and, in general, random events and/or circumstances (e.g.
productivity shocks generated by an e±cient manager) inherent to each
¯rm. Additionally, theory concerning the respective Breusch-Pagan (1980)
and Hausmann and Taylor (1981)-type tests to evaluate the presence of
individual e®ects as well as of choice between ¯xed and random e®ects,
respectively, have yet not been fully developed.
6.2 Data and Variable Description
The database for the empirical model contains information from Superinten-
dencia de Valores and Superintendencia de Sociedades. Both data sets have
annual observations for over 15.000 ¯rms from 1995 to 2003. Given that the
information is not homogeneous in terms of the number of years each ¯rm
reports (i.e. there are ¯rms which begin reporting in years subsequent to
1995 or that stop reporting before the end of the sample either temporally
or completely), an arbitrary depuration criteria was used. Only ¯rms with
information for all variables for at least 4 consecutive years where taken
into account. Thus, the database was split into 6 balanced sub-panels from
which the global estimation was generated, with a total of 8.421 ¯rms and
49.862 observations.
To study the e®ect monetary policy has over the ¯rms' private investment
decision under the presence of derivative markets, a model based on "Tobin's
q" proposed by Abel and Eberly (2002) is estimated. In the model, the ¯rm
chooses its level of investment from the ¯rst-order equations resulting from
11an optimization problem in which capital stock is chosen to maximize the




= ® + ¯1qi;t + ¯2½j;t + ¯3rt + "i;t; (6.1)
where the sub-index i denotes the i ¡ th ¯rm, j represents the industry
the ¯rm belongs to, and t is the moment in time. Investment (I) is de¯ned
as the change in property, plant and equipment, while K represents the
replacement value of capital. Such replacement value is constructed for
each ¯rm using the book value of capital with the following recursion:




where the recursion in period t is initialized using the book value of
Ki;t¡1. Pk;t is de¯ned as the implicit price de°ator of nonresidential invest-
ment 18, while ±j represents the depreciation rate of the j ¡ th industry
19.
With respect to the independent variables, qi;t corresponds to "Tobin's
q". Theoretically, q represents the ratio of market value of capital to its book
value. However, the pricing of assets is an arduous and extensive task; hence,
an impossibility arises as to have a series that allows to de¯ne "Tobin's q" in
such a way. An alternative for successfully measuring this variable consists
in employing a sample which includes only ¯rms that actively participate in
the stock market. Those ¯rms would then have a price on their stock, which
could be used as indicator of market value. Nonetheless, this approach has
a serious selection bias, given the limited number of ¯rms that presently
quote in the local stock market and the fact that such ¯rms are generally
large, which proves them less sensible to changes in the political stance due
to the access they possess to di®erent ¯nancing mechanisms.
Conversely, q is also de¯ned as the present value of expected marginal
returns on capital. Following Abel and Eberly (2002), it can be shown that
under the assumption of a linearly homogeneous operating pro¯t function,
marginal and average returns are equal. Thus, one can approximate the
value of "Tobin's q" using average future operational pro¯ts. However, due
17The derivation of the model, as well as its theoretical justi¯cation, is developed in
detail in Abel, A.B. and J.C. Eberly (2002). "Investment and q with Fixed Costs: An
Empirical Analysis".
18We would like to thank Gabriel Piraquive, of Departamento Nacional de Planeacion
(DNP) for providing us with the series.
19In this case there are two di®erent depreciation rates. There is a 5% depreciation rate
for machinery and equipment and a 6% rate for depreciation of agricultural capital. Hence,
in the estimation the 5% rate is used for depreciating all capital except that which belongs
to ¯rms of the Mining, Fishing and Agricultural sectors (calculation of these depreciation
rates can be found in: Barrios et. Al., 1993, Orozco, 1977, Harberguer, 1969 and Vasquez,
1998).
12to the absence of data concerning these returns, the use of average past











where ¼i;t represents operational pro¯ts of the i ¡ th ¯rm at moment t.
In equation 6.1, ½j;t corresponds to the relative price of capital of industry





where PPIj;t represents the producer price index of industry j at moment
t. Finally, rt in 6.1 corresponds to the real interest rate.
For the speci¯c model used in this paper, three modi¯cations are intro-
duced to the original setup described above. Such changes are justi¯ed in
the following section.
6.2.1 Monetary Policy Instrument
Contrary to most models found in the literature, monetary policy should not
be proxied using the real interest rate alone. A Monetary Conditions Index
(MCI) is used instead 20 to capture the e®ects of monetary policy on all
relative prices. In other words, MCI represents the political stance, which
a®ects real variables through all the transmission mechanisms imaginable. In
this sense, there is no discrimination of the relative e®ect a speci¯c monetary
transmission channel has; on the contrary, there is an attempt to capture the
e®ect monetary policy has through each and every one of its transmission
mechanisms. This channels of monetary transmission are thus not found
explicitly in the model, but are instead modelled implicitly. This said, given
a particular political stance, the e®ect over the ¯rms' investment decisions
is given trough all the transmission mechanisms possible.
Since MCI jointly considers the combined e®ects of changes in real in-
terest and exchange rates over the channels of monetary transmission, it
constitutes itself as a valuable instrument for policymakers to e®ectively
make better decisions with respect to the degree of tightness or looseness in
monetary conditions and the impact this has over aggregate demand.




t = (rt¡2 ¡ r0¡2) +
^ ¯q
^ ¯r
(q1 ¡ q0);¯r < 0 (6.5)
where MCI combines the e®ect of the real interest rate, lagged two periods, with the
relative e®ect of changes in the real exchange rate with respect to a base year (1998). See
Appendix A for details.
136.2.2 d MCI
To capture the e®ect of derivative markets over the ¯rms' investment de-
cision, d MCI is constructed. This variable permits the identi¯cation of the
additional impact monetary policy has on investment decisions once the
existence of derivative markets is controlled for.
In order to construct this variable the estimation needed to obtain the
value of the interest and exchange rate coe±cients of the original MCI must
be replicated (see Appendix A), this time including a new variable to proxy
the deepening of the derivative market (the notional amount of derivatives
held by the ¯nancial system is used).
Due to the lack of available data regarding the amount of hedging instru-
ments held by ¯rms, the aggregate notional amount of derivatives held by
¯nancial intermediaries is used as an approximation of market size. Despite
the fact that this variable does not re°ect the total amount of derivatives
negotiated in the market, it does replicate the market's trend over time. On
the other hand, it is important to point out that the holding of derivatives
by ¯nancial intermediaries, generates hedging spill-overs to ¯rms ¯nanced
by them, for that ¯nancing will be less volatile in quantity and price than
would be otherwise. In this sense, the proxy used for derivative market size
re°ects two dimensions of hedging through these instruments: 1) Directly,
as an approximation of the growth trend derivative markets have shown in
recent years, and 2) Indirectly, by means of the positive e®ect their holding
by banks has on ¯rms that have no access to these type of instruments but
that do have access to bank ¯nancing, in the sense that the credit supply
will ultimately be more stable and, probably, less costly.
Therefore, new values are estimated for the coe±cients associated with
real interest and exchange rates, only now this parameters will implicitly
contain information concerning the impact of derivative markets. From this
coe±cients a new MCI is calculated, such that the di®erence between this
new index and the original generates a variable that captures the speci¯c
e®ect derivatives have on monetary conditions.
A ¯nal comment on the construction of d MCI is noteworthy. The analy-
sis of the impact of derivatives markets over monetary policy is similar to the
problem implied in the evaluation of the e®ect of a particular public policy
over a "control group" (e.g. matching technique, among others). Unfortu-
nately, in the present case, due to the lack of data there is no such control
group (say, data of ¯rms that use derivatives vs. those that do not), which
obligues the use of the construct d MCI as a proxy for the "control group"
e®ect.
6.2.3 Dummy Variable
A dummy variable is introduced in the model, taking the value of 1 in the
years 1998 and 1999 to control for the e®ects of the crudest part of the
14Table 1:
Variable Coe±cient Std Error "t" Statistic
Intercept 0.31980 0.02994 10.68
MCI(t-2) -0.00191 0.00062 -3.07
ICMNET(t-2) 0.11912 0.00504 23.63
TOBIN's q 0.00006 0.00003 2.32
RLT PRICE -0.10696 0.01406 -7.61
DUMMY -0.09657 0.00587 -16.45
economic downturn, which undoubtedly had substantial consequences over
the ¯rms' investment possibilities and decisions.
Hence, the estimated model takes the form:
Ii;t
Ki;t
= ® + ¯1qi;t + ¯2½j;t + ¯3MCIt¡2 + ¯4 d MCIt¡2 + ¯5Dt + "i;t; (6.6)
where MCIt¡2 is the two-period lagged index of monetary conditions,
d MCIt¡2 is the additional e®ect over MCI caused by the inclusion of deriva-
tive markets and Dt is the dummy variable 21.
6.3 Results
The results summarized in Table 1, show all coe±cients to have the ex-
pected sign and to be statistically signi¯cant at the 95% level. Since some
variables used in the estimation correspond to macro variables while others
are ¯rm-level, coe±cient interpretation must be careful. Additionally, it is
important to keep in mind that both MCI and d MCI are stochastic regres-
sors, estimated individually in respective linear regressions. Hence, the total
e®ect of monetary conditions over investment decisions cannot be veri¯ed
in this setup, since the coe±cents associated with MCI and d MCI cannot be
simply "added". For this reason, the analysis is focused on the sign and sta-
tistical signi¯cance of the coe±cients, from which the relationship between
variables predicted by economic theory may be veri¯ed, and what is in itself
the main interest of this paper 22.
As can be seen, consistent with economic theory, "Tobin's q" has a posi-
tive sign and hence, a direct relationship with investment. Thus, increases in
average operating pro¯ts create incentives to invest, possibly by augmenting
¯rms' expected income °ows. Increases in pro¯ts (measured as the 2 year
average of operating pro¯ts weighted by the ¯rms' capital stock) partially
21Data suggests that monetary policy has real e®ects only after two periods.
22An additional test is performed to verify the statistical di®erence between the means
of the original MCI and the modi¯ed MCI which includes the e®ect of derivatives. See
Appendix A for details.
15re°ect increases in the return to capital and thus serve as investment yield
indicators.
The sign of the parameter associated to the relative price of capital is
negative, indicating the inverse relationship this variable has with invest-
ment, just as theory suggests. The price of capital is a measure of its cost,
and the relationship found simply reinforces the notion of a downward slo-
ping demand curve with respect to price.
Additionally, the dummy variable a®ects investment in a negative way
as well. Therefore, the impact of the economic crisis over the real sector
is veri¯ed, by e®ectively showing that investment contracts during the re-
cession period. The crisis episode not only a®ected investment by means of
lower returns on capital for ¯rms, but also by generating a strong tightening
in credit markets, a®ecting the supply of resources from ¯nancial interme-
diaries.
The e®ect of MCI over the investment variable is negative in the model.
In other words, when monetary policy is less tight (negative values of MCI),
the levels of investment rise. Intuitively, more °exible monetary conditions
enhance liquidity, providing a favorable atmosphere for both credit and pro-
ductive activity.
Finally, a positive sign is observed in the parameter associated to the
impact derivative markets have on investment. This is the most relevant
variable in this paper, since it establishes the signi¯cance of the additional
e®ect that monetary policy has over the ¯rms' individual decisions, once the
existence of a market of hedging instruments is accounted for. The positive
sign, contrary to that of MCI, evidences the reduced impact of monetary
policy measures on the real economy by means of the partial dilution of the
main channels of monetary transmission.
There is an important insight arising form this result. As noted earlier,
Vrolijk (1997) considers that the absence of evidence in favor of the diluting
impact derivatives have on British transmission mechanisms, may be due to
the maturity and apparent completeness of the capital market even before
the appearance and development of hedging instruments, which makes their
marginal contribution insigni¯cant.
The contrary seems to happen in Colombia. The signi¯cant impact of
derivatives over monetary transmission mechanisms, after their birth, may
be due to the fact that such instruments o®er important hedging possibilities
in a market with signi¯cant frictions and ¯ssures inherent to a less developed
¯nancial system.
7 Conclusions
In the last few years, derivative markets have undergone a deepening process
which has created serious questions concerning their potential impact on
prices of traditional goods and capital markets, due to the hedging possibi-
16lities they o®er to economic agents. Because of these hedging opportunities,
derivatives may dilute the main channels of monetary transmission in some
cases and/or may promote a faster transmission of changes that monetary
policy induces on relative prices in the short-run.
This paper studies the e®ect derivatives have on Colombia's monetary
transmission channels, using a methodology that excels prior research in
at least 4 ways. 1) Firm-level data is used, 2) An investment model is
estimated, 3) A Generalized Least Squares technique is used to estimate the
panel data, and 4) MCI is used as the a proxy for political stance.
The results coincide with what economic theory predicts. Additionally,
evidence is given to support that monetary policy has lost some e®ectiveness
to a®ect real variables in the short-run, due to the partial dilution of the
main monetary transmission channels caused by the completion of ¯nancial
markets that derivative instruments imply. The former occurs even consi-
dering the lack of development and depth of the domestic capital market.
Vrolijk (1997) sheds some light on this phenomena in his study of the
British market. If the apparent development and depth of the British ¯nan-
cial system has made the e®ect of derivatives but marginal to its complete-
ness, the colombian case o®ers the opposite evidence: lack of completeness
of domestic ¯nancial markets make the marginal e®ect of derivative instru-
ments signi¯cant, due to their role in completing such markets.
Additionally, not only does direct hedging by ¯rms with access to these
type of instruments matter. There may exist hedging spill-overs that occur
when commercial banks buy these derivatives, which translates into a more
stable and cheaper credit supply for ¯rms that have no access to derivative
markets.
This conclusion, which may seem discouraging since it indicates the loss
of e®ectiveness of monetary policy is, on the contrary, positive. Following
Mies et Al.(2003), "...the impact of monetary policy over [economic] activity
is produced, in most cases, due to the existence of a market imperfection
whose existence may have certain costs in terms of e±ciency".
Nonetheless, the results presented herein must be read and interpreted
with caution. Even though there exists evidence that indicates a possible
weakening in the transmission mechanism in Colombia, it is important to
estimate if the transmission itself has speeded up. This is a question left as
a policy recommendation for future research.
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The estimated regression models use the following monthly variables (mea-
sured between 1993 : 4 and 2003 : 4) (See Mora (2000) for details): i) One
lag of the output gap (GAP1) 23, ii) one and two lags of the real interest
rate (TIR1, TIR2), iii) the seventh lag of the real exchange rate (TCR7)
and iv) The stock of derivatives of the ¯nancial system (DERTOT1).
I. Original MCI Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable: GAP Method: Ordinary Least Squares
Date: 12 ¡ 06 ¡ 04 Hour: 14:54 Sample: 1993:4 2003:4
Included observations: 41
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error Statistic Signi¯cance
"t" Level
C 0.919 0.3110 2.9542 0.01
GAP1 1.029 0.0601 17.1289 0.00
TIR1 -0.126 0.0387 -3.2423 0.00
TCR7 0.030 0.0129 2.3233 0.03
R-Squared 0.906 Mean of the Dep. Var. -1.79
Adj R-sq 0.898 Std Error of Dep Var 2.94
Std Err of Estimate 0.939 Akaike inf. Crit. 2.80
Sum of Sq. Resid 32.601 Schwarz inf. Crit. 2.97
Log of the Likelihood -53.477 F Stat. 118.27
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.478 Signif Level of the F Stat 0.0000
Based on the chart, ¯r = ¡0:125 and ¯q = 0:029, are used to build the
monetary conditions index as follows:
MCIz
t = (rt¡2 ¡ r0¡2) ¡
0:029
0:125
(qt ¡ q0) (A-1)
II. Stationarity of the Variables Used in the Regressions
23The GAP is built using a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter applied to GDP.
21Table 2: KPSS Stationarity Test
Model Speci¯cation Variable Critical Value (5%) KPSS Test Ho¤
Derivatives 0.146 0.141277 Ho not rejected
Trend and Intercept GAP 0.146 0.114117 Ho not rejected
TIR 0.146 0.078473 Ho not rejected
Intercept TCR 0.463 0.347988 Ho not rejected
¤ Ho: variable is stationary
III. MCI Parameter Estimates, Including the Derivative Mar-
kets' E®ect
Dependent Variable: GAP Method: Ordinary Least Squares
Date: 09 ¡ 27 ¡ 04 Hour: 16:50 Sample(adjustded): 1998:3 2003:4
Included observations: 22 after the adjustment
Variable Coe±cient Standard Error Statistic Signi¯cance
"t" Level
C -1.4979 0.6317 -2.3712 0.030
GAP1 0.6347 0.0861 7.3723 0.000
TIR2 -0.0943 0.0446 -2.1136 0.050
TCR7 0.0160 0.0122 1.3046 0.209
DERTOT1 0.0486 0.0271 1.7944 0.091
R-Squared 0.8862 Mean of the Dep. Var. -4.0405
Adj R-sq 0.8594 Std Error of Dep Var 1.7576
Std Err of Estimate 0.6590 Akaike inf. Crit. 2.2006
Sum of Sq. Resid 7.3836 Schwarz inf. Crit. 2.4486
Log of the Likelihood -19.2070 F Stat. 33.089
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.7663 Signif Level of the F Stat 0.0000
Based on the chart, ¯r = ¡0:094 and ¯q = 0:016, are used to build the
new monetary conditions index as follows:
MCIz
t = (rt¡2 ¡ r0¡2) ¡
0:016
0:094
(qt ¡ q0) (A-2)
IV. Test for Equality of Means Between Original MCI and
Modi¯ed MCI
Finally, it is important to verify the statistical di®erence between the means
of both the Original MCI and Modi¯ed MCI, in order to prove that the
e®ect of derivatives indeed changes the monetary policy stance.
22Test for Equality of Means Between Series¤
Date: 04/04/05 Time: 17:47
Sample: 1990Q1 2004Q2
Included observations: 58
Ho: ¹0 = ¹1
Method df Value Probability
t-test 114 1.793714 0.0755
Anova F-statistic (1, 114) 3.217408 0.0755
23Appendix B.
G.L.S for an Unbalanced Panel Data Structure, with
Random E®ects over the Intercept.
The single equation econometric model used in this document is a particular
case of the g system-type simultaneous equation SUR originally proposed
by Bi¿rn (1999a).
The estimation process is based on an information structure composed
by N ¯rms or individuals indexed by i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;N. Each individual
i is at least observed once and at most, up to P periods, thus NP de-
notes the number of observed ¯rms P periods with P = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;P, but
are not necessarily consecutive. n is de¯ned as the total number of ob-
servations, such that N =
PP
p=1 Np y n =
PP
p=1 NpP. The accumulated
number of ¯rms observed up to p times is Mp = N1 + N2 + ::: + Np and
thus, M1 = N1;M2 = N2 y Mp = N. From the above the following sub-
sets of ¯rms observed up to P times denoted by Ip, are de¯ned such that
I1 = [1;2;:::;M1], I2 = [1;2;:::;M2], :::, Ip = [1;2;:::;Mp]. I1 cor-
responds to a cross-section and I2;I3;:::;Ip are balanced sub-panels with
2;3;:::;P observations for each individual 24.
Taking into account the information structure described above, it is pos-
sible to formulate the t-th sample equation for the i-th ¯rm, given the H
independent variables including the constant term, as follows:
yit = xit¯ + ®i + uit (B-1)
with i 2 Ip, t = 1;2;:::;p, p = 1;2;:::;P, yit corresponds to the depen-
dent variable and xit is a non stochastic vector (1 £ H) containing the t-th
observation for each of the explanatory variables for the i-th ¯rm, including
1 for the intercept. The latent e®ect (non observed and stochastic) speci¯c
to each individual, corresponds to ®i and uit is the stochastic error term
containing the changes yit come from changes of variables di®erent from
xit. ¯ is the (H £ 1) vector of parameters to be estimated, including the
intercept. These parameters are common to ¯rms.
The fundamental assumptions about orthogonality conditions for the
stochastic components of the model are given by:
E[®i] = 0; E[®i;®0
s] = ±ij; E[uit] = 0; E[uit;ujs] = ±ij;±ts
X
u
where ±'s correspond to the respective delta-Kroneckers, assuming that





u become the scalars ¾® and ¾u respectively. The
24For the balanced panel date case, for instance with P observations, there is only one
nonempty subset Ip.
24compound stochastic disturbance term is de¯ned as: ²it = ®i + uit with
E[²it] = 0; E[²it;²js] = 0
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²)(²i¢ ¡ ²)0, which are the within co-variations for individuals and between
individuals respectively, being T²² = W²² + B²² the total variation.
The same variation and covariation categories are obtained for the ob-

























To obtain the G.L.S estimates by groups, which is the fundamental base





























for i ½ Ip, p = 1;2;:::;P, where, for example, Xi(p) = [xi1;:::;xiH], is a
25(1£H) vector containing the ¯rst observation for each of the H explanatory
variables.
In compact matrix notation for the set of observations, the model for
each individual may be written as:
Yi(p) = Xi(p)¯ + (ep ­ ®i) = Xi(p)¯ + ²i(p)
where ep is a (p£1) vector of ones. For the latter equation it is assumed
that:
E[²i(p)] = 0; E[²i(p)²0





with Ip a p-dimensional identity matrix, Ep = epe0
p a (p£p) matrix with
all of it's elements equal to one and ­²(p) the (p £ p) covariance matrix of
the compound error term, which may be rewritten as:
­²(p) = Bp ­
X¡1





where Ap = (1=p)Ep and Bp = Ip ¡ (1=p)Ep are symmetric idempotent
matrices, with orthogonal columns.
Given that ­²(p) is a nonscalar identity covariance matrix, the Aitken-
type Two-Step Generalized Least Squares estimator for ¯, which uses the



































































































The estimator of the covariance matrix for the estimated parameter vec-
tor b ¯GLS is:








































(p), (b ¯GLS) and V (b ¯GLS) are calculated
using the following algorithm:
1. Obtain the consistent estimators for the ¯rst residuals given by ²it =
Yit ¡ Xitb ¯GLS, with b ¯GLS taken from a regression with all the obser-
vations Yit y Xit.
2. Substitute ²it with b ²it to obtain: c Wb ²b ² y b ¯b ²b ².


























and obtain the estimators b ¯GLS and V (b ¯GLS).
27